Abstract: As the clinical consequences of power failure in intensive care are seldom documented we reviewed the effects of a power failure on patient care, outcomes and the adequacy of our disaster plan. We reviewed clinical records of all ten patients in our department during a 20-minute total hospital power failure, determined the impact of the failure on the therapies being given, and the costs of failed equipment. We assessed the departments disaster plan and identified the causes of the power failure.Nine patients were intubated; six ventilated (one receiving nitric oxide) and three receiving continuous positive airway pressure. Two patients were ventilated by Servo 300,? which continued on batteries, the other four patients were ventilated manually. Six patients were receiving nine inotrope infusions through IMED Gemini,? (battery life 30 minutes). One patient was receiving high volume ultrafiltration using a Gambro? haemodialysis system, which failed. Blood flow to prevent clotting was maintained by turning the roller pump manually. All networked monitoring (SpaceLabs?) failed and three haemodynamically unstable patients were monitored by transport monitors (SpaceLabs Scout?). No patient suffered any ill effect. Failed electronic circuits cost $NZ11,724. The disaster plan was implemented and functioned well. The aged cables supplying Auckland Central failed during an El Nino summer. The hospital generators, supplying power to the city grid, failed to switch over to the hospital. During power failure infusion pumps should be only for inotropes. We now have external 12-volt battery backup. With good pre-planning, safe intensive care continued during a short power failure